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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
SHIRLEY TURNBAUGHf as Personal 
Representative of the Estate of 
LEROY TURNBAUGH, for the Benefit 
of the Heirs of LEROY TURNBAUGH, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
vs. 
EVAN ANDERSON and RED DOME, INC., 
a Utah corporation, 
Defendants-Respondents. 
Case No. 880501-CA 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction under 78-2a-3(2)(h), Utah 
Code Annotated 1953, as amended. 
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
Respondents object to Appellant's statement "Nature of 
Proceedings" in that it declares Respondent Evan Anderson 
(hereinafter referred to as "Evan Anderson") the owner of a 
"defective" front-end loader. There was no evidence that 
the loader was "defective" and, in fact, the evidence was 
that it was in proper working order, and Decedent LeRoy 
Turnbaugh (hereinafter referred to as "Decedent") died 
therein as a result of his own negligent operation of the 
loader. 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Respondents will respond to the issues as stated by 
Appellant. 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, ETC. 
Respondents will respond to Appellant's claims. 
STATE OF THE CASE 
Appellant's Statement of the Case is wrong in that: 
1. It implies that Respondent Red Domef Inc. 
(hereinafter referred to as "Red Dome, Inc.") defended the 
action solely on the basis that it only received royalties 
of $55,000.00 a year when, in fact, Red Dome defended on 
several theories, including the position that it owed no 
duty to an invitee such as Decedent when any hazards or 
dangers were as obvious to Decedent as to Evan Anderson; Red 
Dome, Inc. defended on the basis that Decedent died because 
of his own negligence or actions and not because of any on 
the part of Evan Anderson; that the "Utah Fencing Statute" 
did not apply; and that nuisance law was not applicable; 
2. It implies again that Evan Anderson's front-end 
loader had "lethal mechanical problems" when the evidence 
showed that it suffered no such mechanical problems, nor any 
mechanical problems at all. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Respondents supplement and object to Appellant's 
Statement of Facts as follows: 
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Evan Anderson did not "lease" the loader to Don 
Peterson. He loaned it to Don Peterson upon an inquiry at 
the 4th of: July celebration in Vi 1 Inu.»r>* • wo days before the 
accident. (Tr. page 13) There were no financial 
arrangements. Evan Anderson had loaned the machine to Don 
Peterson several ti mes before. Evan Anderson had no 
knowledge that Decedent was going to operate the loader at 
any time. To the best of Evan Anderson's knowledge, Don 
Peterson always personally ran the loader and he was never 
informed differently by Don Peterson or anyone. (Tr. page 
13/ line Iw rrr. • -, - ft, Line 2r>) 
Evan Anderson did not inform Don Peterson of the 
obvious fact that the loader would quit running when it ran 
out of fue Mvoaas*: v-.i is just a natural attribute of the 
machine. When the engine quits, the brakes and steering 
also quit. (Tr. page 113) The machine was made that way. 
It also was made without a fuel guage. (Tr. pages 24-25) 
Don Peterson had used the machine approximately twenty times 
before the incident and had previously used a similar 
machine of the same make and with the same natural 
attributes. Decedent had also used the bigger 275 Loader in 
June of 19 83 to ] oad overburden. (Tr. page 114) 
Decedent had been on the mining claims several times 
before and must be deemed to have been aware of the 
extensive open pit mining operation being employed by the 
-3-
operators on the Red Dome Claims. Indeed he had ran the 
loader in question all day the day before and one half of 
the day of his death on the claim, excavating overburden 
from the cinders, thus contributing to the excavation of the 
very pit which he backed into. Decedent was working in 
conjunction with the licensee mining cinders on the Red Dome 
Claims in the excavation of the very pit in which he backed 
into. (Tr. page 118, line 25, and page 119, line 1-4) (Tr. 
pages 196-199) 
Any danger or hazard existing from the open pit mining 
in progress at the time of his death was as obvious to 
Decedent as it was to the owner, Red Dome, Inc., or to any 
third party that came upon the property. 
Decedent, as operator, was responsible for checking 
the fuel in the loader and refilling it when needed. Don 
Peterson provided a pump to be used by the operator to 
transfer fuel from the tractor (truck) to the loader when 
need€id. Decedent was aware of the method and means provided 
for fueling the loader. (Tr. page 114, line 10) (Tr. page 
126, line 23, and page 127) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Appellant's claim against Red Dome, Inc. was based on 
a theory of nuisance only. Appellant's claim against Evan 
Anderson was based on negligence. Appellant's evidence 
failed to show any nuisance. Appellant's evidence also 
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failed to show any negligence on the part of Evan Anderson. 
Therefore the trial court, in a well reasoned memorandum 
opinion, dismissed Appellant's Complaint, no cause of 
action. 
ARGUMENT 
1. U.C.A. Section 40-5-1 has no application in this 
case and therefore cannot be the basis for a nuisance claim. 
It is clear from a reading of Section 40-5-1 that it applies 
to underground mining situations. The Red Dome Mining 
Claims are open pit cinder mines. The process of mining and 
the purpose of the mining claims are clearly set forth in 
the testimony of Evan Anderson. (Tr. page 10.) 
Section 40-5-1 provides as follows: 
"The owner, lessee, or agent of any mine who 
by working such mine has caused or may hereafter 
cause the surface of the public domain to form a 
pit or sink into which persons or animals are 
likely to fall shall cause such pit or sink to be 
filled up or to be securely enclosed with a 
substantial fence at least four and one-half feet 
high; ...M (emphasis added) 
It is obvious from reading the statute that it contemplates 
an underground mining situation, such as a coal mine, which 
will frequently cause the surface of the land over the top 
of the underground mine to cave in and form a pit or sink. 
Such a cave-in or pit or sink then becomes an unexpected 
hazard to persons or animals who are otherwise unadvised of 
the underground mine. An owner or operator of an under-
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ground mine that causes a sink or cave-in is under a duty to 
fill up or enclose such a situation. 
Such was not the situation in this case. In his 
testimony, Evan Anderson described the Red Dome Mining 
Claims. He was familiar with the claims, having been 
involved with them in his employment prior to this incident. 
At pages 10-12 of the transcript he describes the mine as an 
open pit mining area where the overburden is stripped off 
and the cinders mined in an open pit fashion. He describes 
how the open pit mining process is conducted in quest for 
different colorsf different grades, and different sizes of 
cinders. On page 12 he describes the Red Dome Claims as 
being about 680 acres in size. The pit into which Decedent 
drove the loader was in the process of being excavated but 
was not caused by an underground mine caving in, forming a 
pit or sink. The area where Decedent was working was not an 
area where the natural terrain prevails on the public 
domain, except for an unexpected sink hole caused by a 
caved-in mine shaft. (Tr. pages 197-199.) 
The Decedent was on the Red Dome Mining Claims for 
purposes of excavating for cinders in the pursuit of his 
employment with Peterson Machine. In his testimony, Don 
Peterson describes how Decedent had been on the mining 
claims numerous times before in the course of his employment 
and he had to have been familiar with the mined surface of 
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the Red Dome Claims. The Decedent was on the property as an 
employee, an invitee of Peterson Machine, and was therefore 
not a member of the public at the time of his accident. 
(Tr. pages 118, 119 and 122.) 
Section 40-5-1 simply has no application to any of the 
facts of this case. A quote from the Honorable Ray M. 
Harding's Memorandum Decision is especially applicable here. 
"Although there is sufficient Utah law upon 
which to base its decision, the Court finds the 
following authority highly persuasive and cogent 
in view of the facts set forth at trial in this 
matter. In Ochampauqh v. City, 588 P.2d 1351, 
1359 (Wash. 1979), the Washington Supreme Court, 
in its analysis of a similar statute to U.C.A. 
Section 40-5-1, favorably cited an earlier 
precedent that held that the Washington statute 
applied only to excavations, 'the area of which 
on the surface is relatively small and which can 
be fenced without great expense.1 Then the Court 
went on to hold that, 'The concern expressed by 
the legislature was that unfenced excavations of 
shafts or holes constituted a trap for the unwary. 
It was not addressing its attention to the open 
and apparent dangers of holes which are filled 
with water, such as the pond in this case.' 
Likewise, in the Court's opinion, U.C.A. 
Section 40-5-1 does not apply to open pit 
excavations, such as the one at issue herein, that 
are relatively shallow and conspicuous to the 
reasonably prudent person. Furthermore, this 
statute was designed to protect unknowing persons 
or livestock from running afoul of hazards created 
by underground mining activities and not 
necessarily to safeguard those working about them 
that are or should be cognizant of their dangers, 
if any." 
Since the pit involved in this case was being excavated at 
the time the accident occurred, it is ridiculous to expect 
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the owner to have a warning sign in place or to have a fence 
built around the pit to keep someone from falling into it. 
2. As pointed out in Argument No. 1, Decedent was 
not on the Red Dome Mining Claims as a member of the public. 
He was on the Red Dome Mining Claims as an employee of 
Peterson Machine and would be properly classified at best as 
an invitee. As the owner of the Red Dome Claims, Red Dome/ 
Inc. had no duty to the Decedent to place a warning indicia 
or barrier of some type around the pit. In the first place, 
the pit would have been obvious to Decedent and anyone else 
in his position. 
The Kentucky Court of Appeals considered a case 
involving nearly the same facts as is before the Court in 
this case, and the Kentucky Court adequately and fairly set 
out the law as it applies in this case. In Leslie Four 
Coal Co. v. Robert Simpson, 333 SW2d 498, 84 ALR 2nd 728, 
the Kentucky Court of Appeals considered the liability of a 
strip or other surface mine or quarry operator to an invitee 
injured or killed during mining operations. This case is 
the leading case to an annotation found at 84 ALR 2nd 728 
which considers that subject. The Leslie Four case was an 
action against a strip mining operator for an injury to a 
truck driver by an earthslide from a high wall as he stood 
between his truck and the high wall. The Lower Court 
granted Judgment in favor of the plaintiff, and the Circuit 
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Court of Appeals reversed. It was the Appeals Court's view 
that the plaintiff must have known of his dangerous 
positionf making applicable the rule that if an invitee 
knows or should know of the dangerf the owner of the 
premises is not liable. At page 731
 f the Court stated the 
rule as follows: 
"The rule is well established that an 
inviter is not responsible to an invitee for an 
injury sustained on the inviter's premises from a 
cause arising from a defect or a danger which the 
invitee knew of or ought to have known of. Nor in 
such a situation does the law require the inviter 
to place the invitee on notice of such a defect or 
danger. This rule is thus stated in detail in 65 
CJS Negligence Section 50, page 543, 'The basis of 
the inviter's liability for injuries sustained by 
the invitee on the premises rests on the owner's 
superior knowledge of the danger, and as a general 
rule he is not liable for an injury to an invitee 
resulting from a danger which was obvious or 
should have been observed by the invitee in the 
exercise of reasonable care or from a condition 
which was as well known or as obvious to the 
invitee as to the inviter, or which the inviter 
had no reason to believe would not be discovered 
by the invitee. There is no duty to warn the 
invitee of any defect or danger which is as well 
known to the invitee as to the owner or occupant/ 
or which is obvious or which should be observed by 
the invitee in the exercise of ordinary care...'" 
The danger in the Leslie Four case was a high wall in an 
open pit coal mine. This apparently means a wall with a 
near perpendicular face which might easily slide off and 
fall on anyone who might be standing near the high wall. 
This was the position in which the plaintiff in the Leslie 
Four case placed himself. The Court of Appeals in the case 
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ruled that the danger was obvious to the plaintiff, or 
should have been as obvious to the plaintiff as it was to 
the mine operator. (See also the 1978 Utah case which 
states the Utah law, similarly Ellertson v. Dansie, 576 
P.2d 867.) 
The danger in this case was even more obvious than was 
the danger in the Leslie Four case. Thus, the owner of 
the Red Dome Claims, Red Dome, Inc., had no duty to warn 
Decedent of the danger or to otherwise take any affirmative 
steps to protect Decedent from any danger which may have 
existed as a result of the excavation that was in progress. 
Therefore, again, Appellantfs Complaint fails to 
allege a cause of action against Red Dome, Inc. 
3. If there was in fact a nuisance, what defenses 
are available to Red Dome, Inc.? 
First of all, Red Dome, Inc. does not agree that 
Section 40-5-1 applies to this situation, nor that the 
Respondents did anything amounting to a nuisance in any 
sense. 
Appellant implies that nuisance law now amounts to 
strict liability and that as a result, Respondents have no 
defense to the Complaint. The Appellant relies on the 
Branch v. Western Petroleum case, 657 P.2d 267. The facts 
of that case are competely distinguishable from those of 
this case. A nuisance arises when one landowner uses his 
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land in such a way that it is harmful to another landowner 
or to another while he is on his own land. This was the 
facts of the Branch case. 
Western Petroleum was discharging polluted water into 
the underground water formation and also onto the surface of 
plaintiff's land. The court found statutory water law that 
strictly forbids such action and found damages for plaintiff 
based on strict liability. 
In this case the Decedent was an employee who had 
voluntarily, and for his own gain, come upon the mining 
claims of defendant and had been working there for two days. 
The Branch case is no authority whatsoever for strict 
liability in this case. The Supreme Court in Branch 
limited its ruling in the following language: 
"This court has not heretofore had occasion 
to consider the legal principles which govern 
liability for the pollution of subterranean waters 
by industrial wastes." (657 P.2d 267, at page 
272. ) 
The holding of the Branch case concerning strict liability 
is limited to the type of case specified by the court above. 
Assuming that a nuisance, only for the sake of 
argument, existed in this case, the law allows the Defendant 
to raise the defenses of assumption of the risk and 
contributory negligence. 
Restatement, Torts 2d, Section 840 B, states: 
"(1) When a nuisance results from negligent 
conduct of the defendant, the contributory 
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negligence of the plaintiff is a defense to the 
same extent as in other actions founded on 
negligence. 
(3) When the nuisance results from an abnormally 
dangerous condition or activity, contributory 
negligence is a defense only if the plaintiff has 
voluntarily and unreasonably subjected himself to 
the risk of harm." 
See also 58 AmJur 2df Nuisance, Section 221, pocket part 
supplement. 
Restatement Tort, 2d, Section 840C, states: 
"In an action for a nuisance the plaintiff's 
assumption of risk is a defense to the same extent 
as is other torts." 
See also 58 AmJur 2d, Nuisance, Section 224, pocket part 
supplement. 
Even though at the time of this incident, July 6, 
1983, Utah law followed a comparative negligence statute, 
the above defenses are still viable. Meese v. B.Y.U. 639 
P.2d 720 (Utah 1981). Jensen v. Intermountain, 679 P.2d 
903 (Utah 1984). Peats v. Commercial Security Bank, 746 
P.2d 1191 (Utah 1987). 
It can only be concluded that the Decedent died as a 
result of his own mistakes and/or negligence and not as a 
result of any nuisance created by Red Dome, Inc., nor 
negligence on the part of Evan Anderson. During the morning 
of the day he died, Decedent was stripping overburden from a 
cinder deposit directly ahead of where Diversified Marketing 
was mining cinders from the pit in which Decedent died. He 
-12-
must have known the pit was there as he was basically 
working the same area in conjunction with another front-end 
loader and operator. (Tr. pages 182-196.) When the other 
operator left to return to the crusher with cinders, 
Decedent apparently backed up along the road, away from his 
work and loading area, and for no apparent reason ran his 
machine out of fuel, turned at a 90 degree angle off the 
roadway and into the pit with there being no explanation or 
need for the action. (Tr. pages 23-27, 35-39.) (Tr. pages 
182-196. ) 
Decedent was negligent and caused his own death 
because (a) he allowed the machine to run out of fuel, 
killing the engine, if that in fact caused the accident; (b) 
he left his work area and drove back up the road away from 
where he should have been and turned off the road at a 90 
degree angle and into the pit for whatever reason he had, if 
that action caused the accident; (c) he was aware of the pit 
and failed to avoid it to his own peril, if that fact caused 
the accident; and (d) it was his own responsibility to keep 
fuel in the machine, if running out caused the accident. 
(Tr. pages 89, 102-103, 111.) 
4. The trial court was aware of Appellant's theories 
of nuisance. The pleadings alleged nuisance as a basis for 
the cause of action against Red Dome, Inc. The question had 
been briefed extensively by both sides in memorandums in 
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support of and in opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment 
and also in trial briefs. 
After hearing all the evidence and hearing all the 
arguments, the trial court found that there was no nuisance. 
(Findings of Fact 3, Record page 168.) This finding was 
made by the court because of the fact that Red Dome, Inc. 
had no control over the mining process; the hazards and 
dangers were as obvious to the Decedent as it was to anyone, 
and generally that there simply was no nuisance where the 
property in question was open pit mining property actively 
being mined and Decedent was there as an invitee and 
employee, knowingly and willingly participating in the 
mining process. 
5. Appellant's Complaint at the Second Cause of 
Action attempts to allege a cause of action against Evan 
Anderson. The allegations allege that Evan Anderson was the 
owner of a front-end loader which Decedent was operating at 
the time of his death. This allegation is correct. 
However, the front-end loader was not rented from Evan 
Anderson by Don Peterson, but rather the loader had been 
loaned by Evan Anderson to Don Peterson. (Tr. page 13.) At 
the time of Decedent's death on July 6, 1983, he was 
employed by Don Peterson but was not an employee in any 
manner of Evan Anderson. Evan Anderson did not know 
Decedent was operating the loader. (Tr. pages 16-17.) 
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The main allegation against Evan Anderson is at 
paragraph 4 of the Second Cause of Action (Record page 3.). 
That allegation alleges that the loader was in an unsafe 
condition, which unsafe condition was known by Evan Anderson 
or should have been known by him. 
Paragraph 6 (Record page 3.) alleges that the brakes 
on the machine and the engine on the said machine failed, 
causing the loader to roll backwards into a pit, thereby 
causing the death of Decedent. Elsewhere in the Complaint, 
Appellant alleges that the front-end loader was unsafe in 
that the engine was faulty and the brakes were faulty. In 
fact, neither the engine nor the brakes nor the machine, as 
a whole, were faulty in any manner. In fact, the opposite 
is true. Following are some extractions from the testimony 
which supports the Court's findings and judgment of no cause 
of action against Evan Anderson. 
Tr. page 7; Line 9, Evan Anderson admits that he 
owned the loader in question. 
Tr. page 13: Line 13, Evan Anderson explains that 
he loaned Don Peterson the loader. 
Tr. page 41, 45-48: Evan Anderson explains that the 
loader had an exceptionally good engine in it, that the 
hydraulics were fair, that the tires were fair, and that all 
of the components were working. Basically the loader was in 
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really good shape for as old as it was and there was not 
anything mechanically wrong with it. 
Tr. page 45-48: Evan Anderson was asked if he had 
ever had any trouble with the brakes and he stated that he 
had not had trouble with the brakes on that machine. 
He was questioned further concerning the brakes and he 
describes how he had used the loader prior to the accident 
and the brakes had been in working order. He stated that 
after the accident he had put the loader upright again and 
loaded it on a trailer to remove it from the area, and in 
the process of removing the loader he had used the brakes, 
and they had worked properly immediately after the accident. 
Tr. page 39-40; In response to the question, Evan 
Anderson describes that the steering worked properly when 
the engine was running, but that there was no steering on 
the loader if the engine was not running because the 
steering was hydraulic and hydraulic pressure was derived 
from the engine running and turning a hydraulic pump. He 
further explains that it was a natural attribute of the 
machine, i.e., the way it was designed, for the steering to 
not work when the engine was not running. The machine had 
not been altered from the way it had been manufactured but 
had been maintained by Evan Anderson. See also page 26 for 
a discussion concerning the nature of the hydraulic steering 
on the loader. 
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Tr. page 25-26; Evan Anderson is questioned 
concerning the brakes and the operation of the brakes on the 
loader. He describes the brakes as being air brakes which 
require air pressure from an air compressor, which also runs 
off the engine. When the engine stopped the air compressor 
stopped and the brakes then were basically non-functional by 
nature, except for an application or two which would be 
powered from an air reservoir but otherwise very limited. 
Tr. page 41: Evan Anderson, when asked if he had 
had any trouble with the engine killing or stopping for 
unexplained reasons, stated "No, not at all on that loader." 
In short, the testimony of Evan Anderson shows that 
there was nothing faulty at all about the loader in question 
at the time of the accident when Decedent was killed. Since 
Appellant's cause of action against Evan Anderson is based 
upon an allegation that the machine was faulty and there-
fore its owner, Evan Anderson, is liable for the death of 
Decedent, and since the evidence completely refutes that 
allegation, there is no basis herein for Appellant to be 
able to maintain its cause of action against Evan Anderson. 
Appellant attempted to base its claim of negligence 
against Evan Anderson on the testimony of Mike Haveron. 
(Tr. pages 94-101.) Mike Haveron had no knowledge at all 
about the loader in question. He worked for Fillmore 
Products, a previous licensee of Red Dome, Inc., but quit 
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during the year 1980. (Tr. pages 96-97.) The loader in 
question was not purchased and moved to the cinder mines 
until June of 1981, a year after Mr. Haveron was no longer 
employed at the mines. His experience was with a different 
loader, a Michigan 12 5 and two 175B loaders, none of which 
was the loader in question. (Tr. pages 177-178.) 
The testimony offered by Appellant from Mr. Haveron in 
his brief, page 13, was objected to by Evan Anderson at the 
trial because of its immateriality and irrelevancy. (Tr. 
page 9, line 8.) It did not concern the loader in question. 
Finally, the testimony was neutral and did not support 
Appellant's theories for liability. 
6. Appellant argues that Evan Anderson should have 
warned Don Peterson about "inherent dangers" (which were not 
dangers in the first place, but natural attributes of the 
machine in question). Next, Appellant argues that since 
Evan Anderson failed to warn Don Peterson, he is thus liable 
in negligence for the death of Decedent. 
In the first place, warning Don Peterson about the 
natural attributes of the machine on July 4, 1983, is 
ridiculous because Don Peterson had used the loader 
approximately twenty times prior, over a course of two years 
or more, and he had previously owned another loader of the 
same age and make, but one size larger. 
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Finallyf Evan Anderson did not know Decedent was going 
to run the loader and there was neither duty nor privy 
between Evan Anderson and the Decedent under any theory of 
law. 
CONCLUSION 
The Court's Judgment of no cause of action against 
Appellant's Complains was fully and completely supported by 
the evidence and law and should be upheld by the Court. 
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